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Abstract—Ride-hailing and ride-sharing applications have re-
cently gained in popularity as a convenient alternative to tradi-
tional modes of travel. Current research into autonomous vehicles
is accelerating rapidly and will soon become a critical com-
ponent of a ride-hailing platform’s architecture. Implementing
an autonomous vehicle ride-hailing platform proves a difficult
challenge due to the centralized nature of traditional ride-
hailing architectures. In a traditional ride-hailing environment
the drivers operate their own personal vehicles so it follows
that a fleet of autonomous vehicles would be required for a
centralized ride-hailing platform to succeed. Decentralization
of the ride-hailing platform would remove a road block along
the way to an autonomous vehicle ride-hailing platform by
allowing owners of autonomous vehicles to add their vehicle to a
community driven fleet when not in use. Blockchain technology is
an attractive choice for this decentralized architecture due to its
immutability and fault tolerance. This paper proposes a frame-
work for developing a decentralized ride-hailing architecture
implemented on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain platform.
The implementation is evaluated using a static analysis tool and
performing a performance analysis under heavy network load.
Index Terms—Blockchain; Hyperledger Fabric; Ride-Hailing;
Ride-Sharing; Information Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Ride-sharing services fill empty seats in cars with people
who are traveling near the same destination as a driver.
This concept of ride-sharing has evolved since its inception
to a large-scale market as mass appeal has skyrocketed its
profitability. The ride-sharing / ride-hailing marketplace has
been rapidly expanding since the launch of companies such as
Uber and Lyft that offer a platform for cooperation between
riders and drivers through mobile applications. Goldman Sachs
has predicted that the ride-sharing market revenue will be
worth approximately 285 billion dollars by the year 2030 [1].
This assumes adoption of self-driving car technology in the
ride-hailing / ride-sharing market continues to advance at the
rate predicted by Goldman Sachs analysts.
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) collect information about the
current state of the environment around them using sensors
(e.g., cameras, lasers, and electromagnetic field detectors)
and feed the information into traditional Artificial Neural
Networks to make decisions about how to operate the ve-
hicle while on the road. The first system that operated in
this manner was the Autonomous Land Vehicle in a Neu-
ral Network (ALVINN) [2]. The blockchain implementation
proposed in this paper addresses the network structure and
communications of participants and would not affect the
Neural Network style operation of the AVs. Development in
the AV field is very promising and is likely to alter our
current and future transportation infrastructure. Ride-hailing
and ride-sharing applications stand to benefit from utilizing
new technologies as they would reduce both operating costs
and the safety of the passengers in their network as AVs have
been shown to operate at a higher safety standard than a
human driver.
Another disruptive technology that has been developed in
the recent years is blockchain. Blockchain was first intro-
duced in 2008 when Satoshi Nakamoto published [3] which
described a peer-to-peer electronic cash system known as
Bitcoin. Since then, this concept of peer-to-peer cash systems
has been labeled as cryptocurrency and many variations of
Mr. Nakamoto’s original system have been developed. Bitcoin
had a specific purpose as an electronic cash system. However,
its underlying technology showed promise for use outside the
original goal. The underlying technology of Bitcoin is known
as blockchain technology and works as a distributed append
only ledger, where all information within the system is stored
and accessed by connected peers. There have been several
different implementations of this underlying system but most
are intended as cryptocurrencies. Lin et al. [4] outline the
blockchain architecture, different types of blockchains, and
security issues and challenges that accompany this technol-
ogy. One implementation that intends to serve as a platform
for private business blockchains is Hyperledger Fabric [5].
Blockchain technology could prove useful to ride-hailing and
AVs by providing a peer-to-peer infrastructure that can be
managed independently from a third party.
Contributions: Our work intends to utilize the more spe-
cialized blockchain platform Hyperledger Fabric to create a
decentralized ride-hailing framework where the infrastructure
would be maintained by collections of drivers working to-
gether. This framework would be beneficial to the development
and adoption of a ride-hailing platform specifically geared
towards AVs because by nature blockchain technology creates
trust between multiple non-trusting entities. “Drivers” are the
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2Fig. 1: Simplified Chain of Hashed Blocks
owners of the AVs and would utilize this platform to form
a network of independent drivers that would function as if
created and maintained by a centralized source with all of
the benefits of centralization. Drivers would have increased
flexibility regarding the price given for a ride and would
have no percentage of profit to pay to an overarching en-
tity. Trust between participants in the network is provided
through the chaincode protocol proposed in this work. Through
the protocol, information is provided only to relevant users
and enforced through implicit access control implemented in
the chaincode functions. The data security provided by the
chaincode functions allows for differing client applications
to participate in the network without fear of data theft or
tampering. This security is provided through the inherit de-
sign of the transaction protocol proposed in this work and
the designed underlying blockchain structure where data is
stored. Transactions made using the proposed protocol do not
allow for specification of requesting user as the certificate
of the requesting user is passed implicitly and used in the
transaction. Additional security is provided through design of
chaincode permissions provided by Hyperledger Fabric and
traditional encryption of packets. The platform is shown to
operate reliably in high network traffic situations and with
different configurations of nodes in the performance evaluation
of this work. The implementation in this paper is transportation
system agnostic in that it is not specific to AV ride-hailing
and could be used as a decentralized ride-hailing platform for
standard human driver ride-hailing.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: Section II
provides background information such as descriptions of re-
lated technologies and challenges that we overcome during
the development of the framework described in this paper,
Section III describes research that has already been done in
related fields, Section IV describes the proposed framework,
and Section V details the implementation of our framework.
Section VI discusses a case study involving a simulation
using real world locations, Section VII evaluates the security
and load resiliency of our implementation, and Section VIII
concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
This section will describe challenges that were anticipated
with this work and our motivation for creating and imple-
menting this framework. A brief background of blockchain
technology, autonomous vehicles, and ride-sharing services is
provided as well.
Fig. 2: Hyperledger Fabric Transaction Flow
A. Overview of Blockchain
This section details general blockchain architecture and
describes Hyperledger Fabric and its role within this work.
1) Description and Variations: Blockchain technology was
first introduced by Nakamoto in [3]. A blockchain is essen-
tially a chain of hashed ’blocks’ where each block contains
a time-stamp, the previous block’s hash, and a collection of
transactions. This idea is illustrated in Fig. 1. Transactions
represent many things, but in the Bitcoin architecture, it is
a transfer of currency from one digital location to another.
In other blockchain implementations these transactions can be
an invocation of code stored in the ledger known as ’smart
contracts’. A block is generated after a set of transactions have
been invoked and are awaiting validation.
There are different types of blockchains and each supports
a different level of privacy and security for different use cases.
Below is a description of the different types of blockchains as
described in [6]:
Public Blockchain: In a public blockchain all miners partici-
pate in the consensus determination process and the ledger is
completely visible to all participants. Public blockchains are
permissionless and do not implement access control regarding
transaction acceptance.
Private Blockchain: Private blockchains utilize a centralized
architecture where one business or entity controls all of the
nodes in the blockchain and writes and validates all transac-
tions. This allows higher efficiency and strict permissions on
who can participate in the network. However, all of the flaws
that accompany centralization remain.
Consortium Blockchain: In a consortium blockchain only
trusted nodes can participate in the validation of blocks but
these trusted nodes are not defined to a single organization or
entity. This can provide some of the benefits of the private
blockchain such as efficiency and privacy of transactions
without compromising the decentralized nature of the public
blockchain.
2) Hyperledger Fabric: A consortium blockchain tech-
nology known as Hyperledger Fabric [5] is utilized in the
implementation and framework proposed in this paper. In
Hyperledger Fabric, nodes must be certified before they can
participate in the network. However, the nodes are not nec-
essarily owned by one entity. Hyperledger Fabric supports
smart contracts (termed “chaincode” in Hyperledger Fabric)
3that can be written in any programming language which
define all allowable interactions within the network. Each
chaincode function has access control functionality such that
only certain users / peers can invoke it. Hyperledger Fabric
“organizations” are used to logically associate peers and users
in a cohesive manner to reduce access control overhead. The
connections between organizations are created and maintained
by a group of ordering nodes termed an ordering service. The
ordering service receives certifications from all participating
organizations which are used to facilitate permissioned inter-
organizational communication via network channels.
When chaincode is installed on a peer it becomes an
“endorsing peer” with the responsibility of validating proposed
transactions that invoke functions of the chaincode. When an
endorsing peer validates a proposed transaction it returns an
“endorsement” to the invoking user which contains the en-
dorsing peers cryptographic signature to mitigate falsification.
The user must receive a minimum number of endorsements
(specified during chaincode deployment) prior to submission
to the ordering service. The ordering service packages received
transaction proposals into blocks according to a modular
algorithm determined at channel creation. Blocks are sent to
all peers participating in the channel to be committed to the
ledger after one more check for validity. The complete flow
from validating a transaction proposal to committing a block
is illustrated in Fig. 2.
B. Ride-Sharing / Ride-Hailing Background
In mainstream media when ride-sharing is discussed the
term is often used incorrectly. The term ride-hailing describes
companies such as Uber and Lyft where a rider requests a spe-
cific ride from their current location to a specified destination.
The term ride-sharing formally defines situations where a rider
accompanies a driver for a portion of a pre-planned trip that
was being driven regardless. The implementation described in
this paper is directed towards ride-hailing platforms but could
be translated to a ride-sharing scenario.
Dynamic ride-sharing describes the problem space of rout-
ing for independent rides where routes must be calculated
at the time of request rather than beforehand. This can be a
challenging topic for optimization due to the lack of internal
structure that other forms of ride-sharing such as buses and
trains benefit from. There are many variables that must be
taken into account such as ride distance, rider wait time, and
total number of rides given.
The framework and implementation proposed in this paper
do not directly contribute to the optimization of ride-hailing
and routing algorithms but rather the underlying ride-hailing
architecture. Decentralization of the ride-hailing platform is
the main goal of this research but for the implementation to be
successful it must provide adequate service to both drivers and
riders. Effective routing protocols are essential to providing
ease of use to consumers.
C. Research Challenges and Objectives
Maintaining a ride-hailing platform independently is costly
and with the addition of AVs it becomes prohibitively expen-
sive for most. The alternative architecture proposed in this
paper allows individuals to lease their AVs to a community
pool where service can be provided to a larger network of
users. AV owner’s gain the benefit of having control over their
organization within the overarching network without having to
create an independent application and reach a critical mass of
users to achieve profitability. Incentive is provided to AV own-
ers through increased profit per ride with no percentage to pay
to a parent company and through a growing user base shared
with competing organizations. This provides a greater degree
of flexibility than can be achieve in a traditional centralized
architecture. This alternative design presents several benefits
but also unique challenges such as the lack of trust between
users and decentralized infrastructure oversight.
Permissioned blockchain technology provides a solution to
these problems by allowing AV owners to securely participate
in the network while sharing the burden of maintaining the
infrastructure. Hyperledger Fabric provides this functionality
and our implementation intends to ease adoption of this
technology. In our framework AV owners can join together
to create Hyperledger Fabric organizations where they have
control over factors such as infrastructure costs and profit
distribution. Reliability of the network can be maintained at
a large scale once multiple organizations are participating
in the network. The infrastructure becomes distributed in
this manner and information security can be provided due
to the dissemination of ride information being limited to
peers participating in a transaction. Currently transportation is
mostly an independent consideration where owning a personal
vehicle is a necessity outside of urban locations. Adoption
of AVs would allow for the normalization of vehicle sharing
which could in turn reduce the environmental impact of the
automotive industry, provide a financially practical form of
transportation to users, and generate profits for AV owners.
Information sharing within the network between actors must
be based on necessity for the sake of security. Chaincode per-
missions provide a mechanism for restricting what information
can be queried by entities in the network which is critical
to the goal of information security. Riders should not have
authorization to access information related to rides that they
did not actively participate in. In a co-rider scenario each rider
should only have access to information that they were present
to observe. For example, co-rider pickup and dropoff locations
should only be accessible to a rider if they were present when
the information was recorded.
Certifications are used to determine the identity of entities
within the network and this determines what resources they
are allowed to access such as specific chaincode functions.
This necessitates the selection of an appropriate certificate
authority implementation that allows for decentralization as
well as strong security with regard to authentication and iden-
tification. In this work each Hyperledger Fabric organization
implements their own certificate authority system to certify
its peers, orderers, and users. This ensures that there is no
dependency on a centralized certificate authority for the system
to work, preserving the distributed nature of the application.
The default certificate authority implementation proposed in
this paper utilizes the cryptogen tool that is part of Hyperledger
Fabric to generate certificates and then manually distributes
4these certificates. A proper certificate authority configuration
is needed to deploy the proposed implementation in a real-
world environment.
III. RELATED WORK
This section will be used to detail the research that has
previously been done in this field or closely related fields.
A. Ride Hailing Privacy
Traditional ride-hailing services such as taxis did not require
strong privacy protection as riders could remain relatively
anonymous during transactions. With the advent of application
based ride-hailing, privacy is a much larger concern. Pham
et al. in [7] propose a framework for preserving location pri-
vacy of riders and drivers without compromising on function-
ality. Pham et al. expanded this framework in [8] by increasing
privacy and addressing the issue of user accountability that can
be abused with anonymity. [8] allows the service provider of
the ride-hailing service to revoke a user’s anonymity should
they abuse the system.
Cao et al. in [9] address transactional privacy issues by
proposing a protocol framework that allows for anonymous
ride-hailing and payment for services. This system uses public-
key cryptography, an online transportation network, and a
third-party payment platform to achieve this. Avodji et al.
in [10] propose a privacy-preserving ride-sharing system
which protects the privacy of users from the service provider
during the matching phase of the ride-sharing system. Imple-
mentation of the privacy protecting protocols proposed in these
frameworks will be important to the framework proposed in
our paper due to the decentralization of the service provider.
B. Smart Contract Security
Kosba et al. in [11] describe “Hawk” a decentralized smart
contract system that does not store sensitive transaction data
such as financial information in cleartext in the blockchain.
This formal model allows for development of decentralized
applications that utilize the blockchain without having to
implement encryption within the application. This is very
relevant to this paper as one of our primary challenges is
securely transferring transaction data; however, Hawk is more
focused on public blockchains where all information in the
blockchain is generally transparent.
Dubovitskaya et al. in [12] propose a blockchain-based
system for storing and sharing electronic healthcare records.
In the paper the implementation is done using Hyperledger
Fabric due to its permissioned nature and access control is
implemented through chaincode permissions. The architecture
proposed by Dubovitskaya et al. is similar in nature to the
architecture proposed in this paper with differences that better
suit the healthcare domain. McCorry et al. in [13] propose
additions to previous blockchain-based voting protocols to
ensure privacy of voting identities as well as avoiding sit-
uations where final voters can calculate results before vot-
ing. McCorry et al. also discuss design choices that were
made to specifically avoid Ethereum specific smart contract
vulnerabilities such as reentrancy attacks and replay attacks.
Atzei et al. in [14] also discuss these attacks among others on
the Ethereum environment in their taxonomic aggregation of
Ethereum vulnerabilities and poor programming practices.
Delmolino et al. in [15] discuss common smart contract
development pitfalls as well as their smart contract security
education efforts. This paper discusses some smart contract
programming pitfalls that are common to any smart contract
development such as logical errors and a lack of data encryp-
tion. Ethereum specific mistakes are presented in this paper as
well as techniques to avoid / correct them. Luu et al. in [16]
discuss common avoidable vulnerabilities in Ethereum such
as Transaction Ordering Dependence, Timestamp Dependence,
Mishandled Exceptions, and the Reentrancy Vulnerability.
While some of these vulnerabilities are not directly tied to
Hyperledger Fabric it can be useful to learn how mistakes are
exploited in other blockchain environments to learn how to
better protect a permissioned blockchain.
C. Blockchain Ride-Sharing
In [17], Mehedi Hasan et al. describe a framework for an
omnipurpose dependable blockchain to be used as the com-
munication platform for an autonomous vehicle ride-sharing
system. There are several cryptocurrency-based decentralized
ride-sharing efforts either currently in development or that
have been developed and are in the market as of right now,
such as [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], and [25].
These projects are similar in design to the project described in
this paper with the main difference being that these projects
are all public blockchain implementations, mostly Ethereum-
based. Public blockchains are not ideal for this work due
to the need for private information to be shared between
smart contracts. The framework proposed in this paper uses
Hyperledger Fabric as its blockchain and the infrastructure is
maintained by organizations of drivers rather than by using a
cryptocurrency where public miners participate in the valida-
tion of transactions. This allows for a finer grain of control
over transaction privacy and transaction validation.
Yuan et al. in [26] address the key research issues in
blockchain-based intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and
outline a 7-layer conceptual mode to aid in the development of
this field. Yuan et al. also perform a case study by identifying
the different architectural components of the most successful
blockchain-based ITS known as La’zooz (as described above)
and mapping these components to their conceptual model.
The existing research that is most related to the research pre-
sented in this paper is the work done by Mehedi Hasan et al.
in [17] and the public blockchain ride-hailing implementations.
This paper differs from the work of Hasan et al. due to
the differing network structure, chaincode protocol, and client
application implementation. The structure of the implemen-
tation of a decentralized ride-hailing platform proposed by
Hasan et al. focuses on the omnipurpose dependable chain
used to support the network. Our research could be integrated
with an omnipurpose dependable chain but is a deeper dive
into the chaincode protocol which facilitates driver / rider
communications and the security of these functions. Our
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Fig. 3: Proposed Hyperledger Fabric Implementation
protocol is designed such that for a user to transact upon the
blockchain they must have a valid certificate and password and
returned information will only be relevant to the requesting
user. Blockchain permissions are also exploited to further
ensure tampering of data is impossible. The other current
blockchain implementations of a ride-hailing platform are all
done utilizing a public blockchain and utilize a cryptocurrency.
The usage of a public blockchain leaves room for improve-
ment in the aspect of transaction privacy and authorized
network participation. Ethereum transactions do provide user
anonymity to a degree but the information within transactions
such as driver / rider locations must also be protected. For
example, on a public blockchain any user may view any
block that has been committed which could lead to dangerous
situations such as a malicious actor tracking the locations of a
driver / rider in order to physically harm or steal from them.
IV. FRAMEWORK
The core components of the Hyperledger Fabric architec-
ture that support the ride-hailing framework proposed in this
work are: Organizations, Endorsing Peers, Channel Structure,
Chaincode Function Structure, Driver / Rider Clients, and Cer-
tificate Authorities. The following subsections will describe
the proposed blockchain ride-hailing framework and the secure
transaction protocol.
A. Architecture
The Hyperledger Fabric organizations used in this frame-
work are created and maintained by groups of drivers / AV
owners. These organizations have several core components and
this section will detail those components and how they interact
to provide ride-hailing functionality while protecting the con-
fidentiality of users. Fig. 3a illustrates each of the components
required by an organization in the proposed framework.
1) Peer Nodes: Organizational peer nodes will act as both
endorsing peers and committing peers. Endorsing peers are
sent transaction proposals from driver and rider client appli-
cations in the network and return signed proposal responses.
Proposal responses are signed cryptographically to minimize
falsification and are marked accepted or rejected based on
the transaction validity. After transactions have been ordered
and validated, all committing peers in the channel commit the
transaction to their local ledger.
Hyperledger Fabric supports multiple channels within a sin-
gle network. Each channel in this case maintains a completely
separate ledger from the other channels in the network and this
is used for data segregation. As seen in Fig 3b this work does
not utilize the multiple channel option of Hyperledger Fabric
but rather utilizes chaincode permissions and structuring to
segment data from unauthorized entities.
2) Certificate Authority / Orderer Node: The root certificate
authority of an organization issues certificates to all of the
entities within the organization which are the orderer node(s),
the peer nodes, and all of the end-user client applications
(drivers and riders). These certificates are stored locally on
each individual entity within the local MSP. Upon creation of
the ordering service all ordering nodes share local MSP details
between one another. This allows all of the organizations in
the network access to the certificates that can be used to
validate the identity of entities in the network. This is done
so that endorsing peers can validate that the user invoking
a chaincode function is both certified through an organi-
zation and is authorized to access the specified chaincode.
Any certificate authority implementation can be used for this
purpose but a client / server architecture is recommended by
Hyperledger Fabric.
B. Chaincode Protocol
Careful design of the chaincode functions that are installed
on endorsing peers is critical to the goal of securely storing
rider information in a manner where it is accessible only
to the rider it pertains. The chaincode can be written in
any language but it is important to note that the proposed
implementation was written in golang and is dependent on
certain functions included in the Hyperledger Fabric core go
library [27]. Future projects that utilize this framework with
chaincode written in another programming language must find
appropriate substitutions for this dependent functionality.
Distinction between individual riders and drivers is done
within the chaincode by creating unique UserIDs and then
utilizing these IDs within the chaincode functions. A UserID
is created by concatenating the rider or driver’s local MSP ID
with the organization’s global MSP ID. Each local MSP ID is
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generated when the entity is registered with the organization
MSP and is guaranteed to be unique within the organization.
The global MSP ID and the local MSP ID are both tied to the
certificate that the user implicitly passes to the chaincode. It is
impossible to impersonate another system user without having
access to their certificate and password. This ensures security
of user information assuming the chaincode framework is
properly used and login functionality is implemented in the
client application.
The following functions provide the core functionality of
the proposed framework and will be called by the client
application by both drivers and riders to facilitate the ride-
hailing process:
registerUser / unregisterUser: Creates a new user object
in the ledger using the unique UserID as the key and the
function parameters for values. The values that are attached
to a unique user are the hash and salt of the rider’s password
and an array of ride structs which will be filled as the user
provides or requests rides. Unregister user needs to delete this
key from the ledger. In our implementation we provide another
chaincode function for users to add their name and provide
extra information to become a driver. This functionality could
be included in this chaincode function if desired.
requestRide: Creates a temporary ledger value for the ride
that is being requested where data will be stored until the
end of the ride. Each participant will retrieve the information
relevant to them to be stored permanently in the ledger at the
end of the ride. This function also needs to create an event
that will be received by listening drivers (implemented in the
client application).
acceptRide: Updates the temporary ride object created by the
previous function to mark that the ride has been accepted and
to designate the accepting driver. This function also creates
an event which alerts the requesting rider that a driver is en
route.
setRideDestination: Updates the temporal ride object to in-
clude the ride destination coordinates when the signal from
acceptRide is received. This is done after driver acceptance to
prevent discrimination based on dropoff location.
pickupRider: Called when the driver reaches the rider’s
location. This function performs checks to ensure the ride is
still ongoing and the driver is at the correct location and then
triggers an event to alert the rider that the driver has arrived.
dropoffRider: Called when the driver reaches the final des-
tination. Pulls necessary information from the temporal ride
object to create a permanent ride object specific to the driver
and creates an event to alert the rider that the ride is ending.
leaveDriver: Triggered by the event created by dropoffRider.
Creates a permanent ride object for the rider and transfers
necessary information from the temporal ride object which is
then deleted because all information has been collected.
setCo-riderInformation: This function is called whenever a
co-rider joins or leaves the ride where the corresponding rider
is present. The co-rider information passed to this function is
added to the temporal ride object to be stored permanently
later in the ride.
getUserInfo: Retrieves the values stored for the calling rider
or driver that are set during registration. This functionality is
used to retrieve the user’s password hash and salt as well as
the list of RideIDs associated with this user.
This core functionality provided by the chaincode is in-
voked by the client application to provide the base ride-
hailing service. The client application implementation could
be changed to allow for more functionality but the above
chaincode functions provide the core framework. The specific
implementation used for this work will be described in the
section below. An illustration of the chaincode protocol is
depicted in Fig. 4.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement the framework described above using two
organizations both having two peers (both endorsing and com-
mitting), an orderer, a certificate authority, and then multiple
user accounts which are utilized by the client application to
register drivers and riders. It was decided that organizations
should maintain a minimum of two peer nodes so that a
singular organization can operate independently while still
providing fault tolerance. There is not a formal certificate
authority node within the organizations in this implementa-
tion but rather cryptogen (the certificate tool provided by
Hyperledger Fabric) was integrated into the build process so
certificates were generated and distributed manually during
network initialization. In this implementation new users have
to be generated manually and can be done after the network is
started; however, the functionality is not included within the
client application. The client application is built using golang
but could be built using any language (particularly languages
with already available Hyperledger Fabric client SDKs). We
utilize the fabric-sdk-go library [28] to communicate with the
endorsing peers of our network.
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Fig. 5: Application Screenshots
The peers of this network are built using docker com-
pose [29] and run within separate docker [30] containers in a
single docker network. The client application currently runs on
the host machine and accesses the Hyperledger Fabric network
through ports that have been exposed to the host machine via
docker. In a production deployment the peer, orderer, and CA
nodes would be servers accessible via WAN. These servers
can all be located within the same machine and could still
run in docker (which is ideal for fault tolerance) but they
need to be accessible via defined sockets separate from one
another. The client application GUI was built using a golang
wrapper for the Qt cross-platform application development
library [31] [32]. This was done so the application could be
developed for desktop and easily ported to android devices.
When the client application is started the user is presented
with a main menu with basic login functionality as shown in
Fig. 5a. When the user navigates to the register button they
are prompted for the information that is needed to create the
ledger object as described in the framework section. Once the
user fills the input fields and continues, the password provided
is salted and hashed and the registerUser chaincode function
is called.
The login functionality of the client application prompts
the user for their username, organization, and password. The
rider is also given an option to authenticate as a rider or a
driver. An option to upgrade to a driver is given after login.
Upon receiving the user’s credentials the application calls the
getUserInfo chaincode function and retrieves the stored hash
and salt values for verification. If the user is logging in as a
driver they are presented with a startDriving function and a
logout function. The startDriving function is the core of the
driver’s client application experience and starts the ride-hailing
process. When the startDriving function is activated the user
is prompted to provide the address of their current location.
Once this is provided geolocation is utilized to convert this
to a latitude and longitude. The geolocation service as well
as the mapping service described below is provided through
a plugin for Qt which interacts with the open-source project
Fig. 6: Simple Co-Rider Situation
named Open Street Map [33]. Once a latitude and longitude
for the driver is obtained the driver’s application updates with
a map of their current location and the driver starts listening
for events on the requestRide chaincode. The starting driver
map can be seen in Fig. 5b.
When a rider authenticates they are presented with the
option to request a ride, update their profile, upgrade to driver
status, or logout. If the user wishes to become a driver they
must provide additional information such as their vehicle
make, model, and year. If the user opts to request a ride he/she
is prompted to enter their starting location and ending location
addresses and the same geolocation process as before takes
place. Once the starting latitude and longitude coordinates
are calculated the requestRide chaincode function is called
and the user listens for events on the acceptRide chain-
code function. When a driver is found the rider sends their
destination coordinates to the setRideDestination chaincode
function where the temporal ride object will be updated. Upon
arrival, the driver’s client application updates the temporal
ride object. As the driver is moving from the rider’s pickup
location to the newly added dropoff location the driver listens
for new ride requests. If a new ride request is received the
driver accepts the ride in the same manner as before and
the original rider receives an event which invokes the addCo-
riderInformation chaincode function. When a ride ends the
dropoffRider chaincode function is called which finalizes ride
information and generates an event with the RideID. All co-
riders use the RideID to update their co-rider dropoff location
in their temporal ride object.
VI. CASE STUDY
This section will define a typical use case and show the
privacy protections in place regarding data stored on the ledger.
A. Simple Co-rider Scenario
A simple ride-hailing situation is shown in Fig. 6 where
two riders (R1 and R2) request a ride from driver D1. In
this scenario R1 is present for R2’s pickup and R2 is present
for R1’s dropoff. This information should be reflected during
the execution of transactions within the Hyperledger Fabric
network. This section will be detailing these transactions in the
proposed implementation by using real locations and showing
the contents of the ledger that are accessible by each respective
entity. The resulting ledger query from R1 should show the
pickup location for R2 but not the dropoff location and vice
versa for the query by R2. The driver’s ride object in the ledger
should contain the pickup and dropoff locations for both riders
as they were present for all events.
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Fig. 8: Temporal Ride Request Created in Ledger When
Rider-1 Requests a Ride
The locations used for this scenario are all public locations
in Nashville, TN and represent a typical use case for the
ride-hailing platform’s operation. The driver starts listening
for new ride events while located in downtown Nashville.
R1’s starting location is Nashville International Airport and
his destination is Nissan Stadium. R2’s starting location is the
Nashville Greyhound station and their destination is Belmont
University. The latitudes and longitudes for these locations are
show in Fig. 7. The locations are stored in latitude / longitude
pairs in the ledger so this table will be important as a reference.
When the driver elects to start listening for ride requests they
are shown a screen similar to Fig. 5b with a marker on their
current location. In a final build of the application this screen
would update with the location pulled from the mobile device
GPS. For development purposes, the coordinates are entered
when driving is initiated and remain static until a ride is
received. At this point in time the driver has authenticated with
the Hyperledger Fabric network and registered for chaincode
events on the requestRide chaincode function.
The next step for this scenario is R1 opts to request a ride
in their application. The rider enters a starting address and
ending address which are converted to latitude and longitude
using geolocation. The client application takes this latitude
and longitude and calls the requestRide chaincode where the
temporal ride request key in the ledger is created which can be
seen in Fig. 8. As seen in Fig. 8 the ID of the key in the ledger
is built using values specific to the rider. Org2PeerOrgMSP is
the unique MSP name and eDUwOT is the rider’s unique ID
within the MSP. For this specific ride request to be generated
this user must call the chaincode because these two values
are generated using the certificate that is passed by the calling
user. This is a key part of how the security of this architecture
functions. The values that are missing are filled in as the ride
progresses and this temporal ride object is used to create the
permanent entries in the ledger before it is deleted at the end
Fig. 9: Completed Temporal Ride Request for Rider-1
Before Deletion
of the ride. The rideRequest chaincode being called also sends
an event to drivers that are listening, providing the rideRequest
ID. When a driver accepts the ride the status field of the
temporal ride request object is updated as “accepted”. This
allows for other drivers to be notified that the ride has already
been accepted.
In this scenario when the driver arrives at R1’s pickup
location and begins moving towards the destination another
ride is requested by R2. The driver is then prompted on his
application to either accept or deny this ride. In this scenario
they accept the ride which updates the current destination.
When R2 requested the ride another temporal ride request
key was instantiated (there can be exactly one active for each
unique rider) with the starting information similar to Fig. 8
but with the values being related to R2.
When the driver reaches R2 for pickup the location must be
stored for R1 so that it can referred to later in the permanent
copy of this ride’s key. R1 was present for R2’s pickup so
this information should be accessible to R1. The driver stores
this information for R1 because he has access to all current
ride information. This is done by iterating through the list of
rides currently in progress and recording the co-rider pickup
location in the temporal rideRequest for each rider. This same
type of iteration is done once R1’s dropoff location is reached
except for each rider that is present during a dropoff the Co-
rider Dropoff Location field is filled.
Fig. 9 shows R1’s temporal rideRequest object prior to
relocation to permanent storage. The Co-rider Pickup Location
field has been filled because R1 was present for this portion of
the ride and therefore the information is relevant to R1. R2’s
final temporal rideRequest was very similar with the exception
that R1’s dropoff location was recorded. The driver handles the
archiving of co-rider pickup and dropoff locations because he
has access to all of this information during the ride. After
the ride is over the riders can only access information that is
directly relevant to them. This architecture can be carried over
to other applications as well or could be expanded within this
application to store additional sensitive data.
VII. EVALUATION
This section details the testing that was performed against
the completed implementation to review its security and load
resiliency.
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A. Chaincode Analysis
There are several tools available for the static analysis
of smart contracts written for public blockchains such as
Ethereum but currently only one static analysis tool for
Hyperledger Fabric chaincode written in golang. This tool is
developed by ChainSecurity and it is a proprietary tool with
the free version only usable for non-commercial use [34]. We
utilized the ChainSecurity tool to analyze our chaincode for
design patterns that result in non-determinism or states that
could be exploited by malicious actors in the system. The
chaincode deployed in our implementation did not have any
flaws according to the analysis done by this tool.
Specifically, the static analysis tool checks for concurrency,
unchecked exceptions, ledger operations that depend on the
global state, field declarations, blacklisted import statements,
reading from the ledger after a write operation, and unsanitized
input to the chaincode. Several of the issues that are scanned
for are related to non-determinism such as the concurrency
check, field declarations, and global state checks. The global
state and field declarations being used in ledger operations
could be exploited because these global variables are only
specific to the peer the chaincode is installed on. If this peer
crashes or becomes out of sync with the other peers of the
network it will never be able to submit another transaction
due to its improper readset. Concurrency is highly discour-
aged within blockchain applications due to inherent issues
such as race conditions that can be mitigated within singular
applications but are more volatile in a distributed scenario.
Exceptions must be checked within the chaincode because if
failure is not predictable it could be used by an attacker to
access unauthorized ledger components. The static analysis
of the chaincode assures that the implementation will not be
susceptible to these types of attacks.
B. Performance Evaluation
We utilized a tool provided by Hyperledger Fabric within
the fabric-test repository [35] called the Performance Traffic
Engine (PTE) to test our implementation under load. PTE is
designed to enable testing of live Hyperledger Fabric networks
with various chaincode, orderers, and peers. All test cases
processed a total of 6,000 transactions for a total of 1,000
Fig. 11: Poisson-Based Traffic Load Test
rides with varying transaction rates. Transactions were sent
at varying rates according to the test distribution but were
handled by four processors with two processors dedicated to
each organization. Each processor was responsible for sending
1,500 total transactions per test. Each data point in Fig. 10 and
Fig. 11 reflects a single test case. All transactions and events
sent were received successfully across all tests. The ordering
service used in our implementation has a batch timeout of 2
seconds and a max message count of 10. Whenever one of
these limits is reached a block is created.
There are three values being recorded across all tests: peer,
orderer, and event latency. Peer latency measures the amount
of time between the moment a transaction proposal is sub-
mitted for endorsement and the moment the endorsements are
returned to the client. The orderer latency measures the amount
of time it takes to receive a transaction acknowledgement from
the ordering service after the client submits its endorsements.
Event latency measures the time between event registration
before submission to the ordering service and a successful
block commit. Each value is averaged over 1000 transactions
and these averages can be seen in the graphs below.
It is worth noting that in order to test this application
at a true scale with thousands of nodes participating in
the blockchain would require thousands of machines due
to the limiting factor being CPU power. These tests cannot
be virtualized with accuracy because multiple virtual nodes
running on a single machine results in a superficial decrease in
network performance. These performance metrics are intended
to indicate the increase in load in different scenarios. Due to
the design of the network load would not significantly increase
past a certain point because the number of nodes validating
a single transaction can be reduced to further distribute the
workload.
1) Constant Rate Network Traffic: The first set of tests sent
transactions to the network at varying constant rates with a
30% deviation. Fig. 10 shows the results of sending traffic to
the network with the minimum delay being 100ms between
transactions and with a maximum delay of 500ms. As the
delay between transactions increased the event latency also
grew at a constant rate. The event latency is measured end-to-
end between transactions so the increase is logical due to the
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artificial delay between transactions. Orderer and peer latency
showed an overall decrease as the delay between transactions
increased due to the decreasing load being placed on the
network.
A second constant rate load test was done with delays
ranging between 10 and 90 ms. The event, peer, and orderer
latency all remained essentially constant throughout the test
due to transactions being sent from one machine using 4
processors. The delay between transactions was not large
enough for previous transactions to be received by the testing
engine. As the tests approached a delay of 90 ms the peer
and orderer delay can be seen to slightly decrease as a more
reasonable testing speed is approached.
2) Poisson Distribution-Based Network Traffic: In the in-
terest of testing the network under different types of loads the
next test sent transactions according to the Poisson distribution
with varying lambda values. The Poisson distribution was
chosen because it relates to events that occur independently
and is often used to model event functions where the average
number of events is known. In our scenario we tested scenarios
with varying transactions per second as the average event
variable lambda.
Fig. 11 shows the results of testing the network with a lower
range of lambda values between 10ms and 90ms. Event latency
remained mostly constant as the lambda value increased due
to the network load increasing and the testing delay decreasing
which had the effect of balancing one another. Event and
peer latency increased as transaction rate increased due to
the increasing load on the network which was the expected
result. After reaching a lambda of 30 the peer and event
latency leveled off and remained constant. This can be again
attributed to the testing engine reaching a point where the
system resources were not enough to send transactions at a
rate higher than 30 per second. A higher lambda test was
conducted as well with lambda ranging between 100 and 1000
but all of the measured latencies remained constant again due
to the limitations of system resources.
3) Organization Restructuring Tests: The final set of tests
measured the effect of having different configurations of peer
and orderer nodes as well as the effect of having more
organizations participate in a network. These tests required
Fig. 13: Peer Latency with Differing Numbers of Peers
more computers so that the results were not limited by the
processing power of a single machine. To complete these tests
a test bed was built using Raspberry Pi computers [36] as the
host machines for the organizations in the testing. A picture
of the test bed is shown in Fig. 12. Each Raspberry Pi was
running a Ubuntu 18.04 image that was designed for ARM
architectures. In each of the tests in this section one of the
Raspberry Pi’s acted as a dedicated Kafka / Zookeeper node
cluster which the ordering nodes of the network communi-
cated with. The Raspberry Pi machines were connected via
a network switch to the testing computer where transactions
originated from. Transactions were sent in bursts with a delay
of 200ms between them. Each burst of transactions sent two
transactions per organization to the respective Raspberry Pi
machine.
The first test measured the effect of joining additional peers
to a single organization while the amount of traffic being sent
remained constant. Neither the speed nor amount of traffic sent
to the organization was adjusted between tests and the results
can be seen in Fig. 13. Two separate tests were conducted,
one required all peers to endorse each transaction and the
other balanced endorsements between peer nodes. In the first
scenario it can be seen that the peer latency was increasing
over time. As each pair of peer nodes was joined to the
network there was around a 5-15 Ms increase in peer latency.
This is due to the communication overhead that is required
by the client to organize the endorsement of their transactions
through each peer. The second test utilized peer load balancing
where only one endorsement from a peer node was required for
a transaction to be considered valid. In this scenario the peer
latency can be seen slightly reducing over time because there
are more peers than there are transactions being received and
therefore the workload on a single peer is never increasing.
A very similar test was also performed with orderers being
the subject but the traffic level that was used was not enough
that the ordering service saw any sort of increase in latency.
It is also worth noting that PTE has functionality for orderer
node load balancing but this did not have an effect on the
latency of the network when included in the tests. All orderer
nodes should be participating in the ordering of transactions
into blocks so this portion of the test was omitted.
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(a) Peer Latency
(b) Transactions Per Second
Fig. 14: Network Statistics of Organization Reconfiguration
Tests
The final test increased the number of organizations as well
as the amount of traffic in the network at each step to measure
the effect on performance. The simulation was again split
into two overarching tests where one required all peer nodes
to participate in the validation of each transaction and one
where the load was distributed evenly between peer nodes.
Each organization was hosted on a single Raspberry Pi running
two peer nodes and a single orderer node. The peer latency
measurements can be seen in Fig. 14a. The peer latency and
the amount of traffic being sent had a positive correlation due
to the work load of each peer increasing at each step in the full
peer participation test. During the load balancing simulation
it can be seen that the peer latency is also increasing but only
by 10-15 Ms at each step. The transactions were being sent
in parallel with two transactions being sent per organization
every 200 Ms. In the load balancing simulation each thread
sending transactions was communicating with a dedicated peer
node which explains the much smaller increase in latency.
Fig. 14b illustrates the transactions per second (TPS) that
were being committed to the ledger. It can be seen again
that the load balancing simulation outperforms the full par-
ticipation simulation. In both tests there is an increase in TPS
before it begins to fall. The increase can be attributed to the
network not being fully utilized until the network traffic rate
is increased to the optimal level. The decrease in TPS comes
after the network reaches a critical mass of transactions after
which performance drops off. The point was reached in both
tests where the peer nodes could no longer process transactions
before the next set of transactions were received which formed
a bottleneck during the endorsement stage. These transactions
are being endorsed on the same machines that must commit
the blocks after the ordering stage. Work is constantly being
done on the peer node which slows down the performance
of the committing stage where additional verification is done.
The only way to subvert this bottleneck would be to segregate
the endorsing peers from the committing peers which would
easily be possible with this architecture; however, it would
increase hardware costs for the organization operators.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper serves as a framework for building a decentral-
ized ride-hailing application that serves as the intermediary
platform connecting drivers and riders. The chaincode proto-
col described in this paper provides security of transactions
through design and could be extended to many applications.
Information returned by from the ledger will only relate to the
calling user due to the implicate certificate that is passed and
further used in the pre-designed transactions proposed in this
work. The implementation utilizes permissioned nature and
built-in organization structure of Hyperledger Fabric to detail
an optimal build for organizations of independent drivers. If
the principles are followed for the chaincode development
then the client application that interacts with the chaincode
cannot risk the safety of the users in the system. Ideally each
organization in this system will have the ability to create their
own client application and still be able to interact with the
Hyperledger Fabric network and share the load of the riders.
This flexibility would allow driver organizations to truly be
in control of their application while also allowing them to
grow their user base together by providing a distributed web
of service.
The assumption under our architecture is that each organi-
zation employs a certificate authority to manage identification
of users in the organization (including both drivers and riders).
This allows for certification of users to remain implemented
without relying on a centralized certificate authority. Certifi-
cate authority public key infrastructure is recommended by
Hyperledger Fabric but future development could utilize a
peer-to-peer public key infrastructure that utilizes a “web of
trust” to add another layer of transparency and decentralization
to the model proposed in this paper. There is also ongoing
research in the area of implementing peer-to-peer public key
infrastructure in blockchains such as Ethereum by utilizing
smart contracts to create and authenticate identities in a
distributed manner. If this type of authentication could be built
into the chaincode of Hyperledger Fabric and utilized for the
framework presented in this paper it could create an easier
system of authentication that relies less on centralization.
Other improvements to the framework could be made such
as additional chaincode functionality (e.g., meeting windows,
reputation system, designated driving zones).
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